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What’s Wrong About the Elective 
Share “Right”? 
Naomi Cahn* 
This Article examines one form of property rights available to a surviving 
spouse, the elective share. The elective share serves as an override to a 
testator’s stated intent by allowing the surviving spouse to choose to take a 
portion of the decedent’s estate — even if the will explicitly disinherits the 
surviving spouse. The Article analyzes a recent five-year period of state 
cases raising elective share issues with the goal of determining the 
circumstances under which an elective share is most likely to be contested. 
The reported elective share disputes typically involve a subsequent spouse 
challenging a will that leaves property to an earlier family. The petitioners 
are almost invariably women. The length of the marriage ranges from a few 
months to decades, and some of the cases involve waiver of the share, some 
involve estranged spouses, and a few involve marriage fraud. Disputes over 
the elective share illustrate family tensions, rarely involving parents against 
joint children, and more frequently pitting a surviving spouse against the 
decedent’s earlier families. 
The Article provides an empirical assessment of the current rationales for 
the elective share and suggests revisions to existing elective share 
approaches that reflect both differing theories of what values marriage 
should represent and the changing demography of marriage and 
remarriage. 
* Copyright © 2020 Naomi Cahn. Naomi Cahn is the Harold H. Greene Chair,
George Washington University Law School. Thanks to Mary Kate Hunter, research 
librarian extraordinaire. I also thank Meredith Condren and Miranda Millerick for 
research assistance. And much gratitude to Adam Hirsch, David Horton, and everyone 
involved in the ACTEC/UC Davis Law Review Symposium, An Empirical Analysis of 
Wealth Transfer Law, for which this Article was prepared. I greatly appreciate comments 
received at a workshop at the University of Virginia Law School. Thanks to Shayak 
Sarkar for his generous comments and to June Carbone for the joint work reflected in 
this Article. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In August 2019, Ric Ocasek signed a will stating that he had made no 
provision for his wife, Paulina Porizkova; he explained that they were 
in the process of divorcing and that “[e]ven if I should die before our 
divorce is final . . . Paulina is not entitled to any elective share . . . 
because she has abandoned me.”1 
Ocasek died a few weeks later. Porizkova is the person who found 
him.2 They had been married for almost thirty years, had two children 
together, and had jointly attended the ceremony marking his band’s 
induction into the Rock & Roll Hall of Fame in 2018.3 He also had four 
children from previous relationships,4 and the marital home in New 
York City was on sale at the time of his death.5 
Is Ocasek’s statement in his will sufficient to ensure that Porizkova 
receives nothing from his estate? Should it be? 
That question goes to the heart of fundamental policies in American 
trusts and estates law. When one spouse dies, the other spouse is almost 
invariably entitled to property rights based on the marriage. These 
rights can occur through intestacy, an omitted spouse statute, election 
against a will, joint tenancy ownership, or community property 
principles.6 Ensuring some rights for a spouse may result in overriding 
the vaunted principle of testamentary freedom. 
This Article examines one form of the property rights available to the 
surviving spouse: the system of election. The elective share allows the 
surviving spouse to choose to take a portion of the decedent’s estate, 
even if the will explicitly disinherits the surviving spouse.7 The Article 
1 Suzy Byrne, Ric Ocasek Cut Estranged Wife Paulina Porizkova from His Will, 
Claiming She ‘Abandoned’ Him: Report, YAHOO (Nov. 8, 2019), https://www.yahoo.com/ 
entertainment/ric-ocasek-cut-estranged-wife-paulina-porizkova-from-his-will-claiming-
she-abandoned-him-report-155623596.html [https://perma.cc/XF5W-CTWG]. 
2 Claudia Harmata, Inside the Cars’ Frontman Ric Ocasek and Paulina Porizkova’s 
Decades-Long Relationship, PEOPLE (Sept. 16, 2019, 3:07 PM), https://people.com/music/ 
ric-ocasek-and-paulina-porizkovas-relationship-timeline/ [https://perma.cc/3SND-LFU5]. 
3 See Paulina Porizkova and Ric Ocasek Announce Separation After 28 Years Together, 
FOX NEWS (May 3, 2018), https://www.foxnews.com/entertainment/paulina-porizkova-
and-ric-ocasek-announce-separation-after-28-years-together [https://perma.cc/LA3E-
JZLJ]. 
4 Harmata, supra note 2. 
5 See Byrne, supra note 1. 
6 See, e.g., NAOMI R. CAHN ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES IN FOCUS chs. 1-2, 8 
(2019). 
7 See Adam J. Hirsch, Freedom of Testation/Freedom of Contract, 95 MINN. L. REV. 
2180, 2222-25 (2011). An elective share is a statutorily granted right of a surviving 
spouse to claim a particular share in the estate of the deceased spouse, with the amount 
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analyzes a recent five-year period of state cases raising elective share 
issues reported on either Lexis or Westlaw8 with the goal of determining 
the circumstances under which an elective share is most likely to be 
contested.  
The case analysis in Part II9 shows that reported elective share 
disputes typically involve a subsequent spouse challenging a will that 
leaves property to an earlier family. The petitioners are almost 
invariably women. The length of the marriage ranges from a few months 
to decades. There are various important variations in the cases: some 
involve premarital agreements, some involve estranged spouses, and a 
few involve marriage fraud. 
Based on this examination of reported cases, in Parts IV and V, the 
Article questions the current rationales for the elective share and 
suggests revisions to existing elective share approaches. First, the 
Article observes that disputes over the elective share illustrate family 
tensions, rarely involving parents against joint children, and more 
frequently pitting a surviving spouse against the decedent’s earlier 
families.  
Second, it notes the multiple gendered dimensions of the elective 
share, including questions about both the dependency and the 
“economic partnership” rationales that are used to justify it.10 While the 
elective share developed out of an explicitly gender-based concern for 
protecting the dependent wife, this study shows a more nuanced reality 
of who benefits from the elective share.11 It thus provides further 
questioning of the partnership rationale for the elective share in light of 
contemporary family demography.12 
of the share determined according to state law. The surviving spouse can claim a 
particular amount of the decedent’s estate, even if (i) the decedent leaves a will devising 
property to the surviving spouse (but less than the amount of the elective share), or (ii) 
the decedent leaves a will that disinherits the surviving spouse (absent a valid and 
enforceable pre- or post-nuptial agreement). See UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. II, pt. 2 
(amended 2010). In some states and under the UPC, an elective share can be claimed 
when the decedent dies intestate. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202(a) (amended 
2008) (referring to the right of a surviving spouse to take an elective share). 
8 This was done through separate searches of the systems. For further information, 
see infra Part XYZ.  
9 See infra Part II.  
10 See infra Part V.B (noting questions about the partnership rationale). 
 11 Cf. ELIZABETH R. CARTER, ARE PREMARITAL AGREEMENTS REALLY UNFAIR?: AN 
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF PREMARITAL AGREEMENTS 5 (2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3436412 [https://perma.cc/DAA6-BJST] (suggesting similar 
questions about stereotypes for those who enter into premarital agreements). 
12 Laura Rosenbury has argued that the partnership theory of marriage “is not a 
long-term strategy for eliminating gender-role oppression,” and “may even play a role 
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Third, it contrasts the property subject to the elective share to 
property available for division at divorce.13 For purposes of determining 
the property subject to the elective share, all of the decedent’s property 
(and today, under the Uniform Probate Code, all of the surviving 
spouse’s property) is included, regardless of when it was acquired.14 By 
contrast, in only a minority of non-community property states is all 
property, whether marital or separate (hotchpot or “kitchen-sink”),15 
available for distribution at divorce;16 the hotchpot system, however, is 
the direction in which the Uniform Probate Code (“UPC”) has moved, 
at least for marriages of fifteen years or longer. But if the elective share 
approach is designed to implement the concept of marriage as a 
partnership, then it may be overbroad by including what would be 
termed “separate property” in all community property and most 
common law title jurisdictions.17 This, in turn, results in questions 
about normative goals when a marital relationship ends. That is, in 
recognition that a relationship is ongoing, perhaps a surviving spouse 
should receive the same or even more at death, in light of the state’s 
support for marriage; or, perhaps, the partnership rationale should be 
challenged in both the contexts of divorce and death.18  
The fundamental issue at the core of the Article is the jurisprudential 
basis for the partnership theory of marriage. Choosing to marry means 
opting into a series of override and default rules at the state and federal 
level designed to promote emotional and economic partnership and 
in reinforcing traditional gender expectations, including the expectation of wifely 
sacrifice.” Laura A. Rosenbury, Two Ways to End a Marriage: Divorce or Death, 2005 
UTAH L. REV. 1227, 1289 (2005).  
13 Cf. id. at 1289-90. 
 14 See Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Uniform Probate Code’s Elective Share: Time for 
a Reassessment, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 7-9 (2003) [hereinafter Time for a 
Reassessment]. He observes that the goal was “to establish a system that approximates 
the results that would be achieved by a fifty-fifty split of marital assets,” albeit without 
“the costs and uncertainties associated with post-death classification of the couple’s 
property to determine which is marital (community) and which is individual 
(separate).” Id. at 6.  
15 Even in these states, however, courts “usually award[] most or all preexisting, 
gifted, and inherited property to the owner spouse.” Shari Motro, Labor, Luck, and Love: 
Reconsidering the Sanctity of Separate Property, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1623, 1630 (2008). 
The term “kitchen-sink” may have first appeared here. See J. Thomas Oldham, Tracing, 
Commingling, and Transmutation, 23 FAM. L.Q. 219, 219 (1989). 
16 See DOUGLAS ABRAMS ET AL., CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW ch. 9 (5th ed. 2019). 
 17 For a critique of the analogy to commercial partnership theory, see Shahar 
Lifshitz, The Liberal Transformation of Spousal Law: Past, Present and Future, 13 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 15, 59 (2012). 
18 See Rosenbury, supra note 12, at 1274-79. 
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interdependency. These laws range from assumptions about default 
health care surrogate decisionmakers during the marriage to the 
increasingly common presumption of joint custody at divorce to Social 
Security derivative benefits and include the intestacy presumptions and 
marital estate tax provisions at death.19  
The conceptual basis for the partnership theory arose at a time when 
the divorce (and remarriage) rate was low, especially for those over the 
age of fifty,20 and just as women were moving into the workforce in 
larger numbers.21 The conceptual basis for the elective share is far older, 
although the share is evolving towards a partnership model; the cases 
addressed in this Article potentially undermine the goal of full 
adherence to the partnership theory, at least in subsequent marriages.22 
The Article offers a range of options that could be implemented — if 
there is clarity on the goals of the elective share override (and if the 
elective share is retained in some form). One set of reforms might 
address the composition of the property subject to the elective share. 
This initial, property-focused set of reforms could mean limiting the 
assets subject to the elective share to property acquired during the 
marriage, potentially including the active and passive appreciation of 
 19 On the goals of marriage, see Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2601 (2015). 
For a defense of the state’s treatment of marriage as imposing obligations and 
nonmarriage as respecting intent, see June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Nonmarriage, 76 
MD. L. REV. 55, 57-60, 80-84, 93-94 (2016) [hereinafter Nonmarriage]; for challenges,
see Melissa Murray, Obergefell v. Hodges and Nonmarriage Inequality, 104 CALIF. L. REV.
1207, 1207-08, 1213-14 (2016) (arguing that Obergefell offers a “rose-colored vision”
of marriage); Melissa Murray, One Is the Loneliest Number: The Complicated Legacy of
Obergefell v. Hodges, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 1263, 1265 (2019) (exhorting that Obergefell’s
“prioritization of marriage and its denigration of life outside of it is cause for serious
concern, even alarm”). On income tax and Social Security issues, see, for example, Anne 
L. Alstott, Updating the Welfare State: Marriage, the Income Tax, and Social Security in the 
Age of Individualism, 66 TAX L. REV. 695, 695 (2013); Naomi Cahn, The Golden Years,
Gray Divorce, Pink Caretaking, and Green Money, 52 FAM. L.Q. 57, 61 (2018)
[hereinafter The Golden Years]; Naomi Cahn & June Carbone, Uncoupling (2020)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
 20 See Susan L. Brown et al., Later Life Marital Dissolution and Repartnership Status: 
A National Portrait, 73 J. GERONTOLOGY, SERIES B: PSYCHOL. SCI. & SOC. SCI. 1032, 1032 
(2018). See generally Frank Olito, How the Divorce Rate Has Changed over the Last 150 
Years, INSIDER (Jan. 30, 2019, 6:33 AM), https://www.insider.com/divorce-rate-changes-
over-time-2019-1#since-the-turn-of-the-21st-century-the-divorce-rate-continues-to-
decline-rapidly-13 [https://perma.cc/26MN-PNF2]. 
 21 See, e.g., JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS: HOW INEQUALITY IS 
REMAKING THE AMERICAN FAMILY 196 (2014). 
 22 Moreover, to the extent that the partnership theory of marriage, like the elective 
share, is premised on dependency, perhaps the continuation of each should be 
challenged. See Rosenbury, supra note 12, at 1288-89; infra Part V. This serves, 
accordingly, as a significant challenge to family law jurisprudence on marriage. 
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separate property as well.23 Another option relating to assets subject to 
the elective share could mean excluding property that would otherwise 
be left to the decedent’s children, joint or otherwise. A second reform 
might involve decreasing the share available to the surviving spouse in 
second (or subsequent) marriages. While the UPC, for example, allows 
for full vesting after fifteen years of marriage, the rising incidence of 
gray divorce and remarriage means that many new marriages, 
potentially longer than fifteen years, will be contracted at later stages in 
life,24 potentially after much of the decedent’s wealth has already been 
accumulated. This reform could be implemented by increasing the 
amount of time for full vesting for all marriages or, for a subsequent 
marriage, lengthening the amount of time or decreasing the percentage 
available. A third reform could be awarding a spouse who has initiated 
divorce or separation proceedings the lesser — or the greater — of the 
elective share or divorce property distribution and alimony. A final 
recommendation concerns coordination of estate planning and family 
law. The Article concludes by emphasizing the need for reform as the 
demography of marriage changes.25 
 23 Under divorce law, only some forms of appreciation in the value of separate 
property are typically included. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 8-201(e) (2020). 
That appreciation may result from one spouse’s active efforts during the marriage or 
from passive appreciation; some states include both forms of appreciation, others 
distinguish between them, and statutes are often unclear as to which is intended. See 
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.05 
(AM. LAW INST. 2002) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION]; see 
also Motro, supra note 15, at 1637 (“The treatment of income from and appreciation of 
separate property is a source of much angst and debate as jurisdictional rules vary 
dramatically and some are too murky and untested to produce predictable results.”). 
Regardless of that distinction, the change in value of separate property is asymmetric, 
with only the value of the asset, and depreciation (either active or passive) not typically 
included. Joint debt, however, is included in property distribution. See, e.g., FAM. LAW 
§ 8-201(e); ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 16, at 633 (“Liabilities accumulated during a
marriage are also marital property subject to division . . . .”).
 24 See Gretchen Livingston, Chapter 2: The Demographics of Remarriage, PEW RES. 
CTR. (Nov. 14, 2014), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2014/11/14/chapter-2-the-
demographics-of-remarriage/ [https://perma.cc/A2EM-MVZY]. 
 25 While others suggest that the elective share might be made available to 
nonmarital partners, for example, Lawrence W. Waggoner, Marriage Is on the Decline 
and Cohabitation Is on the Rise: At What Point, If Ever, Should Unmarried Partners Acquire 
Marital Rights?, 50 FAM. L.Q. 215, 244 (2016), this Article and others focus on marriage 
as an appropriate dividing line for such rights. See, e.g., Carbone & Cahn, Nonmarriage, 
supra note 19. 
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I. THE DEVELOPMENT AND CELEBRATION OF THE ELECTIVE SHARE
The elective share only exists in common law title states. Community 
property states create joint ownership rights in property acquired 
during marriage, so each spouse is entitled to half of that property at 
death.26 There is no similar protection in common law title states in the 
absence of the elective share; parties are free to title property earned 
during marriage and dispose of it as they wish at death.27 Elective share 
statutes thus ensure that a surviving spouse can receive something from 
the decedent, even where there is a will that leaves nothing to the 
survivor.28  
The elective share developed from the English common law concepts 
of dower and curtesy, with the goal of protecting the wife from 
disinheritance to ensure her support.29 Dower accorded the widow a life 
estate in one-third of her husband’s lands;30 upon marriage, a husband 
 26 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 9.1 cmt. 
b (AM. LAW INST. 2003); Richard F. Storrow, Family Protection in the Law of Succession: 
The Policy Puzzle, 11 NE. U. L. REV. 98, 106-07 (2018). Community property states may 
provide additional forms of protection for a surviving spouse. For example, in 
Louisiana, a surviving spouse is entitled to a “marital portion” if one “spouse dies rich 
in comparison with the surviving spouse.” LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2432 (2019). This 
portion cannot be waived. See id. art. 2330; CARTER, supra note 11, at 13. 
27 Ironically, divorce is different. See Rosenbury, supra note 12, at 1246-47. 
 28 States vary on whether the elective share is available only when a decedent dies 
testate or whether an election can be made when the decedent dies intestate. See, e.g., 
UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-201 to 2-207 (amended 2010) (testacy not required). 
29 E.g., Spencer v. Williams, 569 A.2d 1194, 1197 (D.C. 1990) (“It was originally
intended to protect the wife from disinheritance and to prevent her from becoming a 
public charge . . . .”); Boan v. Watson, 316 S.E.2d 401, 402 (S.C. 1984) (noting that 
when wives first received the right to dower, they “labored under the many burdens of 
coverture . . . . The law of dower gave a surviving wife a gender-related benefit with no 
corresponding benefit to surviving husband”); Thayer v. Thayer, 14 Vt. 107, 118 (1842) 
(“It is a right which was instituted for the subsistence of the wife during her life, and 
the husband is bound, by the law of God and man, to provide for her a support during 
his own life, and, upon his death, the moral duty does not end. He should provide for 
her so long as she lives.”); see Susan N. Gary, The Oregon Elective Share Statute: Is Reform 
an Impossible Dream? , 44 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 337, 339 (2007); Sheldon F. Kurtz, The 
Augmented Estate Concept Under the Uniform Probate Code: In Search of an Equitable 
Elective Share, 62 IOWA L. REV. 981, 982-90 (1977). Dower was addressed in Chapter 
Seven of the Magna Carta. Id. at 983. 
30 George L. Haskins, The Development of Common Law Dower, 62 HARV. L. REV. 42, 
48-49 (1948). Because dower was designed to support the widow after her husband’s
death, it “escaped the strictures of coverture because a wife would come into possession
of her dower only upon the death of her husband, when she would once again be a feme 
sole.” Allison Anna Tait, The Beginning of the End of Coverture: A Reappraisal of the
Married Woman’s Separate Estate, 26 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 165, 174 (2014); see Bryan v.
Bryan, 16 N.C. 47, 53-54 (1827) (“It may be a hardship for a married woman who brings 
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was entitled to control of his wife’s property and, once a child was born, 
he obtained a life estate in her property.31  
At a time when married women could not hold property in their own 
names, dower provided protection at a spouse’s death.32 The nineteenth 
century separate sphere ideology was premised on distinct roles for men 
and women, and women’s intrinsic dependence on men (a father, a 
husband) because of those roles; married women were responsible for 
maintaining the home, married men for breadwinning.33 Women may, 
according to Blackstone, have been a “favorite,”34 but that protection 
meant they were subordinated to their husbands during marriage, could 
not own property in their own names, and were hardly capable of 
committing their own crimes.35  
At death, the disadvantages continued: dower provided fewer rights 
than curtesy, although it may have provided more substantive economic 
a fortune to her husband to find herself and her children reduced to poverty; but she 
knew when she married him that the law gave him an absolute property in all her 
personal estate capable of immediate possession, and in all she should afterwards 
acquire, if reduced by him into possession during coverture. The hardship might have 
been guarded against by a settlement . . . .”). See generally Ferry v. Spokane, P. & S. Ry. 
Co., 258 U.S. 314, 318 (1922) (upholding dower as the prerogative of the States, not a 
constitutionally protected “privilege and immunity”); LeighAnna C. 
Cunningham, Note, Michigan’s Elective Share: An EPIC Failure, 94 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 
273, 275 (2017) (noting that dower predated the Norman Conquest). 
 31 Upon marriage, the husband’s estate “by the marital right” meant that he obtained 
“a right to the rents and profits, together with the use and enjoyment, of all the realty 
of which his wife was then seised and of which she thereafter became seised during 
coverture.” George L. Haskins, Curtesy in the United States, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 196, 196 
(1951) [hereinafter Curtesy]. The husband’s estate by the marital right ended upon the 
wife’s death. Id. When a child was born into the marriage, then the husband acquired 
curtesy rights to a life estate in all of her real property that was capable of inheritance 
by her issue. Id.; see Ariela R. Dubler, In the Shadow of Marriage: Single Women and the 
Legal Construction of the Family and the State, 112 YALE L.J. 1641, 1661 (2003). For a 
list of six differences between dower and curtesy, see Haskins, Curtesy, supra note 31, 
at 197. 
32 See, e.g., Tait, supra note 30, at 174. 
 33 See, e.g., Maxine Eichner, The Privatized American Family, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
213, 250, 250 nn. 235-36 (2017). As Eichner notes, this ideology did not describe the 
lives of a disproportionately high number of black women. See id. at 250 n.236. 
34 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *433; Jill Elaine Hasday, Protecting Them 
from Themselves: The Persistence of Mutual Benefits Arguments for Sex and Race Inequality, 
84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1464, 1497 n.161 (2009). 
 35 See Naomi Cahn & June Carbone, Blackstonian Marriage, Gender, and 
Cohabitation, ARIZ. ST. L. REV. 1247, 1249 (2020); see also Dubler, supra note 31, at 1667 
(arguing that dower defined femininity and extended coverture “beyond the end of a 
marriage”). 
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rights because women owned comparatively little property.36 Some 
women also held property in “separate estates,” property that, because 
it was placed in a trust on her behalf, enabled a woman to hold equitable 
title but no legal title that would otherwise have been subject to her 
husband’s control upon marriage.37 Dower, limited as it was, may also 
have provided more rights to the surviving wife than divorce, which was 
based on title-based property distribution.38 
States that once required dower or curtesy moved towards a gender-
neutral elective share,39 although some states retain the terminology.40 
The New York legislature explained that it was responding to women’s 
 36 That is, a one-third life estate interest in her husband’s lands may have far 
exceeded in value his curtesy right in one-third of her property. Cf. Alyssa A. 
DiRusso, Testacy and Intestacy: The Dynamics of Wills and Demographic Status, 23 
QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 36, 74 (2009) (“A widow’s right to dower, traditionally a one-
third life interest in land held by her husband, was hardly comparable to the rights of a 
male widower . . . .”). The life estate assured “continuity of the enterprise in the hands 
of the next generation.” John H. Langbein, The Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family 
Wealth Transmission, 86 MICH. L. REV. 722, 726 (1988). Langbein also suggests that 
widowhood was less common in the mid-nineteenth century than today, with less 
disparity in lifespans. See id. New York recognized a married woman’s right to protect 
her dower interest, even while her husband was alive. See, e.g., Clifford v. Kampfe, 42 
N.E. 1, 2 (N.Y. 1895). 
 37 A trustee held legal title. Tait, supra note 30, at 167. A married woman was even 
able to devise both real and personal “separate” property. Id. at 203. 
 38 In both contexts, courts developed equitable remedies to ensure the wife received 
some of the husband-titled property, such as “fraud on the elective share.” See, e.g., 
Karsenty v. Schoukroun, 959 A.2d 1147, 1151, 1165 (Md. 2008); Martin D. 
Begleiter, Grim Fairy Tales: Studies of Wicked Stepmothers, Poisoned Apples, and the 
Elective Share, 78 ALB. L. REV. 521, 523 n.12, 526 (2015). 
 39 See, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 190 (1929) (abolishing dower); Rubin v. Myrub 
Realty Co., 279 N.Y.S. 867, 870 (N.Y. App. Div. 1935); JAMES A. FOLEY, COMBINED 
REPORTS OF THE COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE DEFECTS IN THE LAWS OF ESTATES FOR THE
YEARS 1928-1929-1930-1931-1932 AND 1933, at 72, 75 (1935) (listing eleven states 
allowing a wife to take an election and seventeen allowing a husband to make such an 
election); see also Ralph C. Brashier, Disinheritance and the Modern Family, 45 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 83, 93 (1994); Deborah S. Gordon, Engendering Trust, 2019 WIS. L. REV. 
213, 216-17 (2019) (“Spousal rights on death have evolved from the demeaning system 
of dower, which treated women as objects in need of care and ‘vessels’ for the 
bloodline, to more gender-neutral systems . . . .” (footnotes omitted)). 
 40 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-11-101 (2019). Dower was more likely to be 
claimed in Arkansas than curtesy. See J. Cliff McKinney, With All My Worldly Goods I 
Thee Endow: The Law and Statistics of Dower and Curtesy in Arkansas, 38 U. ARK. LITTLE
ROCK L. REV. 353, 354 (2016) (“[O]nly 80 Arkansas cases include the word ‘curtesy’ 
and exclude the word ‘dower.’ In other words, nearly 62% of the cases only concern 
dower and fewer than 6% are just curtesy cases.” (footnote omitted)). Michigan also 
retains dower. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2202 (2019). 
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dependence on male breadwinners41 and the privatization of that 
dependence.42 Not all states moved towards the abolition of dower and 
adoption of a gender-neutral elective share, however, and state courts 
continued to consider the constitutionality of dower-only statutes until 
the first decade of the twenty-first century.43 
Although married women had been able to own property in their own 
name since the middle of the nineteenth century, domesticity norms 
discouraged them from working outside of the home.44 By the end of 
the nineteenth century, all of the American states had adopted some 
form of the Married Women’s Property Act, which allowed women to 
retain control of their separate property during the marriage and 
ownership at divorce.45 Still, the mothers of young children did not 
typically work outside the home if their husbands could support them, 
so they were the needy spouses envisioned by state legislatures (and 
they were the ones whose husbands had property). 
As dower moved towards gender-neutrality, changes in the nature of 
property ownership and the increasing acceptance of nonprobate 
 41 The New York legislative report was concerned both about protecting against the 
“spendthrift” and protecting the “faithful” wife, and it noted cases where husbands had 
unjustly disinherited their wives. See FOLEY, supra note 39, at 18-20, 166, 257. Although 
the Commission phrased its work in gender-neutral terms to protect the “widow or 
surviving husband,” it noted that its goal was to “correct the almost entire absence of 
protection for the widow under the present law.” Id. at 12. For further analysis of New 
York’s abolition of dower, see Dubler, supra note 31, at 1672. 
42 See Dubler, supra note 31, at 1702-03. 
 43 See, e.g., In re Estate of Baer, 562 P.2d 614, 616 (Utah 1977) (“It is a legitimate 
state purpose to support widows who would have difficulty supporting themselves and 
therefore does not violate the equal protection clause.”); In re Estate of Miltenberger, 
737 N.W.2d 513, 517 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007). Courts found support in the Supreme 
Court’s 1974 decision in Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974), which upheld the 
conferral of different benefits on widows and widowers (Ruth Bader Ginsburg lost the 
appeal); cf. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638-39, 643, 648 (1975) (striking 
down benefit scheme that excluded widowers based on “archaic” generalizations). 
Michigan continues to use the term dower, and its elective share statute refers to “[t]he 
surviving widow of a decedent.” MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2202 (2020). 
44 See June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Democracy and Family, in STATING THE FAMILY: 
NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE STUDY OF AMERICAN POLITICS (Julie Novkov & Carol Nackenoff 
eds.) (forthcoming 2020). See generally Dorothy E. Roberts, Spiritual and Menial 
Housework, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 51, 60 (1997) (discussing race, housework, and 
domesticity norms); Reva B. Siegel, Home As Work: The First Woman’s Rights Claims 
Concerning Wives’ Household Labor, 1850–1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073, 1086 (1994) (“In 
households too poor to conform to antebellum norms of domesticity, wives spent 
significant portions of their time earning income for the family.”). 
 45 See June Carbone, The Futility of Coherence: The ALI’s Principles of the Law of 
Family Dissolution, Compensatory Spousal Payments, 4 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 43, 49 (2002). 
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devices prompted some reforms in the elective share.46 While dower 
applied to all the land the husband owned at any time during the 
marriage, the elective share applied only to property owned at death. 
Consequently, a spouse who wanted to bypass an elective share statute 
only had to “[transfer] the property to other beneficiaries through non-
probate means,”47 such as revocable trusts. 
To address this problem, the UPC uses the concept of the augmented 
estate, expanding the elective share to include not just nonprobate 
assets, but also each spouse’s separate property and certain transfers to 
others.48 Throughout, however, the UPC reflects a tension between a 
support theory — how to ensure that the surviving spouse receives 
adequate financial payment — and a partnership theory, based on the 
idea that both spouses equally contribute to property acquisition during 
the marriage.49 The UPC was amended in 1990 in an attempt to better 
reflect the partnership theory of marriage and respond to the “multiple 
marriage society.”50 The amended UPC included an approximation 
system, “to reflect the partnership theory and each spouse’s entitlement 
to one-half of the couple’s marital property.”51 As the length of the 
marriage increases, so does the percentage of property subject to the 
elective share, with the maximum possible election at 50% of all 
included property after fifteen years of marriage.52  
 46 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-201 to 2-207 (amended 2010); Gary, supra note 29, 
at 339-44. There were other factors as well, including dower’s limits on land 
inalienability and women’s rights advocacy. See, e.g., Dubler, supra note 31, at 1671; 
Jason C. Kirklin, Measuring the Testator: An Empirical Study of Probate in Jacksonian 
America, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 479, 492 n.86 (2011). 
 47 Gary, supra note 29, at 340; see Angela M. Vallario, The Elective Share Has No 
Friends: Creditors Trump Spouse in the Battle over the Revocable Trust, 45 CAP. U. L. REV. 
333, 334 (2017). 
 48 UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-201 to 2-207 (amended 2010); see Vallario, supra note 
47, at 346-47.  
 49 See Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 235, 
269, 269 n.177 (1996). 
 50 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. II prefatory note (1990) (amended 1996); Gary, 
supra note 29, at 341-42; Mark Glover, A Social Welfare Theory of Inheritance Regulation, 
2018 UTAH L. REV. 411, 439 (2018). 
 51 Gary, supra note 29, at 342; UNIF. PROBATE CODE §2-203 (amended 2010). The 
approximation system is designed to separate marital and nonmarital property; for 
example, it presumes that 30% of the augmented estate is marital property if the 
decedent died after five, but less than six, years of marriage. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 9.2 (AM. LAW INST. 2003). The surviving 
spouse is then entitled to elect to take one-half of the marital property portion. 
 52 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 9.2 (AM.
LAW INST. 2003). 
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The UPC was further amended in 2008, increasing the support for the 
surviving spouse, through the supplemental share, from $50,000 to 
$75,000.53 The 2008 revision also adjusted the approximation system, 
with the goal of providing an elective share that equals half of the 
marital property of the augmented estate.54  
Of course, there is enormous variation between the states as to what 
property is included in the elective share and the percentage given to 
the surviving spouse, as shown below in Table 1, and commentators 
argue that many elective share statutes do not reflect the partnership 
theory of marriage.55 This undoubtedly is the result of states continuing 
to rely on the historical concepts of dower and curtesy as the basis for 
the elective share.56 In contrast to what happens at divorce, however, in 
which dependency is reflected through an individualized determination 
of alimony,57 any support at death is available only in a temporary form, 
typically while the estate is being administered.58 Moreover, states apply 
a standard rule to property distribution that does not consider any of 
the equitable distribution factors applied in most states’ divorce 
proceeding.59 
If partnership theory, then it should account for property acquired 
during the marriage. In hotchpot states, partnership theory takes the 
 53 Raymond C. O’Brien, Integrating Marital Property into a Spouse’s Elective Share, 
59 CATH. U. L. REV. 617, 706 (2010). 
54 See id. at 707-08. 
 55 See Storrow, supra note 26, at 136-37 (“[T]he elective share appears to be more 
promotive of testamentary freedom. It allows the testator to contradict the assumptions 
upon which intestacy law is built and then, only if the surviving spouse complains, 
scales them back to an amount less than what society has deemed she should receive in 
intestacy. Less support for the theory of marriage as an economic partnership can 
scarcely be imagined.”). 
56 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 9.1 (AM.
LAW INST. 2003). 
57 See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 281 (1979). 
58 E.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 474.260 (2019) (providing for a “reasonable allowance”
for surviving spouse during probate); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-404 (amended 2010) 
(same). This support is available, regardless of the theory underpinning the elective 
share.  
 59 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3E (2019). A few of the community property 
states — California, Louisiana, and New Mexico — require equal division, but the 
others — Arizona, Idaho, Nevada, Texas, and Washington — allow for equitable 
distribution. BRETT R. TURNER, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY § 8:1 (4th ed. 
2019); see, e.g., Kelly v. Kelly, 9 P.3d 1046, 1048 (Ariz. 2000). At death, by sweeping in 
the surviving spouse’s property, the augmented estate approach may account for 
support needs (as well as the partnership theory); a spouse who is wealthier than the 
decedent may receive little through the elective share, reflecting less need for support 
(although, not necessarily recognizing the partnership model). 
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form of including both separate and marital property as potentially 
subject to distribution.60 By contrast, the partnership theory in 
community property states takes the form of including only property 
acquired by the efforts of either spouse during the marriage. 
Table 1. Property System Applicable to the Elective Share61 
Property System No. of 
Jurisdictions 
Jurisdictions 
Probate-only 16 Al, AK, CT, DC, IL, IN, KY, 
MI, MS, NH, OH, OK, RI, TN, 
VT, WY 
Semi-augmented 12 DE, FL, IA, MD,62 MA, MO, 
NJ, NY, NC, OR, SC 
Augmented 13 AK, CO, HI, KS, ME, MN, MO, 
NB, ND, SD, UT, VA, WV 
 60 The hotchpot alternative emerged during the drafting of the Uniform Marriage 
and Divorce Act § 307. See UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 307 (amended 1973); 
Mary Moers Wenig, The Marital Property Law of Connecticut: Past, Present and Future, 
1990 WIS. L. REV. 807, 828 (1990) (“The American Bar Association’s Family Law 
Section ‘steadfastly opposed’ UMDA’s marital property provision and fought for and 
won reversion to hotchpot or kitchen sink equitable distribution . . . .”). The American 
Law Institute recommends a hybrid system, in which individual property is, over time, 
recharacterized as marital property:  
After many years of marriage, spouses typically do not think of their separate-
property assets as separate, even if they would be so classified under the 
technical property rules. . . . The longer the marriage the more likely it is that 
the spouses will have made decisions about their employment or the use of 
their marital assets that are premised in part on such expectations about the 
separate property of both spouses.  
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 23, § 4.12 cmt. a. 
 61 Alex S. Tanouye, Surviving Spouse’s Rights to Share in Deceased Spouse’s Estate, 
ACTEC (Aug. 2018), https://www.actec.org/assets/1/6/Surviving_Spouse%E2%80%99s 
_Rights_to_Share_in_Deceased_Spouse%E2%80%99s_Estate.pdf [https://perma.cc/22TA-
RJE4]. 
 62 Maryland’s elective share system changed in 2019, and the revised approach is 
reflected in Table 1. See H.B. 99, Reg. Sess. (Md. 2019). It differs from the UPC in that 
no spousal assets are included in the augmented estate, and it has a complicated 
accounting for various kinds of trusts already passing to the spouse. It also permits a 
judicial override, again unlike the UPC. The state legislature explicitly noted that while 
one legislative goal was to preserve flexibility for the testator, the other was a support 
theory. Id. § 3-402 (“To ensure that a surviving spouse is reasonably provided for during 
the surviving spouse’s remaining lifetime . . . .”). 
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Finally, the elective share is only available to a spouse, or, in a few 
states, a domestic partner.64 It is thus an example of the law’s 
“channeling function,” fostering shared notions of appropriate 
behavior.65 On this theory, the elective share supports the socially-
desirable institution of marriage and its associated norm of expected 
fairness.66 The partnership rationale has become integral to the 
institution.67 
II. WHO SEEKS THE ELECTIVE SHARE?
To take a step towards understanding who is protected by the elective 
share, this Article reports on the first study of nationally available 
 63 Community property states do not provide for an elective share. “In states having 
the community-property regime of marital property, no provision is made for the 
surviving spouse to take an elective share because each spouse acquires an undivided 
ownership interest in half of the property that the couple acquired during the marriage 
other than by gift, devise, or inheritance. The elective share of the surviving spouse is 
therefore a feature of non-community-property states. Some community-property states 
do recognize elective-share-type rights in so-called quasi-community property, 
however, which is property acquired in a non-community-property state that would 
have been community property had it been acquired in a community-property state.” 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 9, pt. A, 
introductory note (AM. LAW INST. 2003). 
 64 Thus, in states that accord legal status to domestic partners, that status typically 
includes the same rights as marriage, and the elective share is one such right. For 
example, Hawaii permits a reciprocal beneficiary to claim an elective share. HAW. REV. 
ST. § 560:2-202 (2019).  
 65 See Carl E. Schneider, The Channelling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 495, 504 (1992) (describing the channelling function of family law as a means for 
promoting social institutions); cf. June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, The Triple System of 
Family Law, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1185 (2013) [hereinafter The Triple System]; Linda 
C. McClain, Love, Marriage, and the Baby Carriage: Revisiting the Channelling Function
of Family Law, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2133, 2133 (2007). Ariela Dubler has argued that
“contemporary inheritance law continues to revolve around a traditional family model,
cajoling people into that framework if they want to claim the protections of probate
laws.” Dubler, supra note 31, at 1712.
66 See Schneider, supra note 65, at 498, 501-02. 
 67 The dependency rationale remains significant. See, e.g., Dubler, supra note 31, at 
1654 (“[L]awmakers still look to marriage as a public policy tool capable of privatizing 
women’s economic dependency.”). On the gendered aspects of the elective share, see 
Rosenbury, supra note 12, at 1289 (arguing that the partnership theory is “not a long-
term strategy for eliminating” gendered marital roles). 
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elective share cases where the decedent died testate68 from January 2014 
to January 2019.69 The search resulted in seventy-six cases that 
appeared to be relevant; further analysis showed that four of those cases 
(each involving widows) were duplicates, four concerned an omitted 
spouse claim70 rather than an elective share, one concerned a disputed 
 68 This meant that cases focused solely on whether an elective share could be taken 
when the decedent died intestate were excluded. E.g., In re Estate of Rivera, 194 A.3d 
579, 586 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018) (noting that the husband “appears to conflate the statutes 
governing spousal share and elective share and his cross-references are confusing and 
misplaced. Because Decedent died wholly intestate, the spousal share statute controls 
any claim”). While some states allow a surviving spouse to choose an elective share over 
an intestate share, cases raising these issues do not present the same tensions between 
testamentary freedom and surviving spouse protections. The search was done in state 
courts. Because probate law is state law, elective share cases are most likely to arise in 
state courts. Moreover, during the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court articulated 
the “probate exception,” which precluded federal courts from hearing various matters 
relating to probate. See, e.g., James E. Pfander, Standing, Litigable Interests, and Article 
III’s Case-or-Controversy Requirement, 65 UCLA L. REV. 170, 197 (2018). The Court has 
limited the probate exception to claims brought on the basis of diversity of citizenship. 
See, e.g., Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 311-12 (2006). 
 69 The search was done on both Lexis and Westlaw. There were two separate 
searches on Westlaw. The first used the West Key Number System. That approach 
worked well, but only for those cases that had those West editorial enhancements. That 
was a search for 409VII(K), which included all cases under the West Key numbers in 
the category of “election” (Wills 778-803), limited to all dates after 01/01/2014. There 
were 127 results. The other search was an advanced search using connectors and 
expanders. A research librarian chatted with a West Reference Attorney to come up with 
a good advanced search to fill in the holes, after having worked on the search using the 
West Key Number System. The second search used connectors and expanders: adv: 
surviv! /5 spous! wife husband /p elect! /s against will estate & DA(aft 
12/20/2013). There were 182 results from this search. Of the 309 cases (total), almost 
80% were irrelevant; the term “election” was used in contexts such as “elect to take 
under a will.” Or, a claimant who took under a will claimed she should have been 
entitled to property that she might have been able to claim had she instead filed for her 
elective share. See, e.g., Hayes v. Hayes, 198 A.3d 1263, 1264 (Vt. 2018). Another case 
involved an attempt to reopen an estate for procedural irregularities, including a failure 
to advise the widow of her elective share. See Jubie v. Dahlke (In re Estate of Dahlke), 
319 P.3d 116, 118-19 (Wyo. 2014). For Lexis, a similar search of terms and connectors 
was used for all states and cases from 1/1/2014 through early 2019: surviv! /5 (spous! 
or wife or husband) /p elect! /s (against or will or estate) to ensure as complete a set of 
cases as possible. While the databases may not provide all relevant cases, my goal is 
qualitative, rather than statistically valid claims, particularly because the search 
included the limited class of reported cases. 
 70 Some states and the UPC include explicit protection for an omitted spouse. See 
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-301 (amended 2010); Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance on the Fringes 
of Marriage, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 235, 263 (2018) [hereinafter Inheritance on the Fringes] 
(identifying thirty-three states). Some do not. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-5.3 
(2019) (specifying that the omitted spouse can elect against the will); Storrow, supra 
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divorce and not the elective share,71 and one concerned only intestacy. 
I did not include the duplicates in overall counts, but did include the 
four omitted spouse cases in a distinct category; although they do not 
necessarily show the same deliberateness in leaving out the spouse 
(simply a failure to update, which may have differing causes),72 they do 
show the general trends of widows in subsequent marriages going to 
court.73  
Before continuing, an important caveat: reported cases provide a 
limited snapshot of what is actually happening on the ground, so this 
study has inherent limitations.74 The goal was simply to find out what 
types of disputes are most likely to be litigated to the point of being 
available through the major online services.75 All claims, then, must be 
placed in that context. 
note 26, at 112-13. Unlike the elective share, omitted spouse statutes have been adopted 
in community property states. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 21610 (2019). 
71 Wilson v. Fisher (In re Estate of Wilson), 913 N.W.2d 273 (Iowa Ct. App. 2018). 
 72 See JOEL C. DOBRIS ET AL., ESTATES AND TRUSTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 193 (2d ed. 
2003).  
73 One other case involved intestacy, but the lower court had conflated the intestate 
and elective share. See In re Estate of Scarpaci, 176 A.3d 885, 889 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017). 
 74 Thus, for example, the Article does not calculate the percentage of total probate 
cases in which a spouse has chosen an elective share. Moreover, the number of reported 
elective cases is comparatively small, compared to the number of deaths of a married 
person each year. On the other hand, the comparative rarity of these cases is in accord 
with other work showing that election is relatively infrequent. See Jeffrey N. Pennell,
Individuated Determination of a Surviving Spouse’s Elective Share, 53 UC DAVIS L. REV.
<starting page>, <PIN, pg. 13 of manuscript> (2020) [hereinafter Individuated 
Determination] (noting that approximately 2% of the cases in which spouses had been 
disinherited in Georgia resulted in a challenge); Jeffrey N. Pennell, Minimizing the 
Surviving Spouse’s Elective Share, 32 U. MIAMI INST. ON EST. PLAN. § 903 (1998) 
[hereinafter Minimizing]. The actual instance of disinheritance may be approximately 
twenty percent. See Pennell, Individuated Determination, supra note 74, at 12 n.29. But 
the number of nontraditional dispositions may be higher. See David Horton, In Partial 
Defense of Probate: Evidence from Alameda County, California, 103 GEO. L.J. 605, 630 
(2015). As a more general matter, more than 10% of probate cases may result in 
litigation, albeit not always over the terms of the will. Id. at 629-30 (noting that 5% of 
the wills probated in Alameda County resulted in disputes, with other conflicts 
concerning issues such as who would be appointed to serve as personal representative). 
 75 For an analysis of the utility of qualitative work, see, for example, Sara Sternberg 
Greene, The Broken Safety Net: A Study of Earned Income Tax Credit Recipients and a 
Proposal for Repair, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 515, 529-30 (2013). This study does not purport 
to make statistically valid claims. Reported and unreported cases may differ. Jeffrey 
Pennell’s data on claims in probate records in Georgia (most of which did not result in 
a reported case), while not directly analogous because there is no elective share, do 
show some similar patterns concerning the lack of contest concerning disinheritance. 
See Pennell, Individuated Determination, supra note 74. 
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I coded each of the cases for a series of variables: which spouse 
brought the action, was it a first marriage for either, did the court award 
the elective share, was there a prenuptial or other form of waiver, were 
the parties estranged, and then a catch-all for other potentially relevant 
information, such as the size of the estate. When the case itself did not 
include all of this information, I was sometimes able to find material — 
particularly the existence of prior children — through a search of 
obituaries.76  
The cases included a variety of elective-share-related issues.77 Some 
of the cases did not, for example, concern a disputed attempt to claim 
the elective share, such as a challenge to the existence of the marriage 
itself,78 but instead a conflict over what was included in the augmented 
estate or a question of the timeliness of the filing of the claim. One case 
went to the Minnesota Supreme Court for determination of whether 
requiring court approval for a conservator’s elective share claim 
unconstitutionally distinguished between protected persons and 
nonprotected persons.79  
Of the seventy-one cases shown in the Table 2 below, fifty-six 
involved a wife claiming, fifteen involved a husband claiming, and one 
involved a girlfriend claiming against a boyfriend.80 There were thirteen 
first marriages and fifty-eight subsequent marriages.81 Each of the 
 76 This also often resulted in pictures of the deceased. Although I was able to collect 
information on gender, I was not able to do so consistently for race. 
 77 Given my goal of focusing on family dynamics, and because cases did not always 
decide on the ultimate receipt of the elective share, it did not seem productive to code 
for actual receipt.  
 78 See, e.g., Brown v. Sojourner (In re Estate of Brown), 818 S.E.2d 770 (S.C. Ct. 
App. 2018) (decedent left his estate to six named children, who then challenged the 
validity of the marriage between the decedent and the putative surviving widow when 
she claimed her elective share); In re Estate of Badruddin, 60 N.Y.S.3d. 528 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2017) (two women claimed to be the surviving spouse). The only same-sex 
marriage case that turned up involved an “election” to take under the decedent’s will 
and concerned a question of whether the alleged spouses had been divorced, and it is 
not included in the seventy-one elective share cases in Table 2 infra. See Wilson v. Fisher 
(In re Estate of Wilson), 913 N.W.2d 273 (Iowa Ct. App. 2018). The court in that case 
assumed that the couple were validly married at some point before November 1991, and 
the question was the applicability of a revocation upon divorce statute, not spousal 
election. Id. 
 79 See In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of Durand, 859 N.W.2d 780, 782 
(Minn. 2015). This was one of the cases that appeared twice. Nonprotected persons 
(that is, persons not subject to a guardianship) do not need court approval to file. 
 80 See In re Estate of Tito, 150 A.3d 464 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016). The boyfriend had 
been previously married. See id. at 466. 
 81 Where I could not determine the existence of a second family, I coded as null. 
One of the husbands who claimed was in his seventh marriage. See In re Estate of Meek, 
CAHN MACRO V3.DOCX (DRAFT) (DO NOT DELETE) 6/2/2020 4:37 PM 
2020] What’s Wrong About the Elective Share “Right”? 119
omitted spouse cases involved a subsequent marriage.82 There were 
twenty-one cases involving some form of waiver; all but one of them 
occurred in a subsequent marriage.83 Nine cases involved some form of 
estrangement or the filing of divorce proceeding, and in three of those 
cases, election was allowed.84 Four cases involved questions of whether 
the election had been filed during the appropriate time period, another 
two concerned choice of actions (did filing a challenge to a will preclude 
taking an elective share, and vice versa), and two dealt with the choice 
between taking as an omitted spouse or claiming an elective share. 
Table 2. Elective Share Cases 
Characteristics Number
Total Cases 71 
Female Ps 55 (3 omitted spouse) 
Male Ps 15 (1 omitted spouse) 
First Marriage* 13 
Subsequent Marriage 58 (4 omitted spouse) 
Prenuptials/Waivers 2185  
*coded as such where uncertain
No. M2013-01070-COA-R3-CV, 2014 WL 2553469, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 4, 
2014). 
82 In a subsequent project, I hope to analyze omitted spouse cases. 
 83 See McNaught v. Johnson (In re Estate of McNaught), No. 4-16-0132, 2016 WL 
7118859, at *1 (Ill. App. Ct. Dec. 6, 2016). In the other cases considering the validity 
of the prenuptial agreement or waiver, the court upheld the agreement to preclude filing 
for the elective share. (In four cases that included a prenuptial agreement, the dispute 
concerned another issue altogether, such as the existence of the marriage. See, e.g., In re 
Estate of Brown, 818 S.E.2d at 770). 
84 Courts carefully examined the facts and circumstances of abandonment. The 
three cases allowing election, notwithstanding separation, were similar in that the 
surviving spouse was seen as innocent, or at least as not having wronged the decedent. 
For example, in In re Peterson, the decedent had moved out of the marital home to live 
with a nonmarital partner. See Lovett v. Peterson (In re Peterson Estate), 889 N.W.2d 
753, 755 (Mich. Ct. App. 2016). When a non-joint daughter sought to preclude the 
surviving widow from claiming her elective share, the court held that, even though the 
relevant statute precluded a “willfully absent” spouse from claiming the share, the 
widow had not caused the separation, so was not willfully absent. Id. at 759. 
“Abandonment” does not require marital misconduct and may involve mutual consent 
in Missouri. See Estate of Heil v. Heil, 538 S.W.3d 382, 389 (Mo. Ct. App. 2018). 
 85 All but one of the prenuptial agreements or waivers were in second marriages. In 
most of these cases, it was the surviving wife claiming against a deceased husband’s 
estate, and the elective share waivers were typically effective. 
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Although the cases did not always address whose property would be 
taken to satisfy the elective share, most of the disputes centered on 
claims of a spouse against a child from an earlier relationship. In one of 
the first marriage cases, a surviving spouse was taking at the expense of 
a joint child, but in most of the subsequent marriage cases, there were 
pre-existing children of one, or both, spouses.86 
III. DEMOGRAPHY AND WEALTH
Most of the elective share cases involved widows not in a first 
marriage. That these cases involve women is not surprising; women’s 
life expectancy at birth is eighty-one years, while for men, it is seventy-
six, and even at age sixty-five, life expectancy is two years longer for 
women.87 Moreover, women are typically younger than the men they 
marry.88 
The subsequent marriage piece may be a little surprising. The elective 
share system developed at a time when divorce and remarriage were 
comparatively rare. Approximately 1-2% of all women were divorced in 
1930 while today that is true of 15% of women; approximately 11% of 
women are widowed, and that proportion has remained comparatively 
stable over the past century.89 An estimated one-quarter of people 
married today are not in a first marriage, almost double (13%) the rate 
in 1960.90 Moreover, the number of remarriages is increasing, and is 
now at 40% of new marriages, with half of those involving a remarriage 
for both spouses.91 
Remarriage is more common among men than women; almost two-
thirds (64%) of previously married men remarry compared to just over 
 86 I was able to determine the existence of prior families in many cases either 
through the reported case or doing a separate search for an online obituary.  
 87 See Sherry L. Murphy et al., Mortality in the United States, 2017, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION (Nov. 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/databriefs/ 
db328.htm#fig1 [https://perma.cc/4T9F-5JVL]. 
 88 The age of first marriage for women in the United States is twenty-eight; for men, 
it is thirty. See A.W. Geiger & Gretchen Livingston, 8 Facts About Love and Marriage in 
America, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2019/02/13/8-facts-about-love-and-marriage/ [https://perma.cc/JS8A-XT2T]. 
 89 See JULISSA CRUZ, MARRIAGE: MORE THAN A CENTURY OF CHANGE 1 (2013), 
https://www.bgsu.edu/content/dam/BGSU/college-of-arts-and-sciences/NCFMR/ 
documents/FP/FP-13-13.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y38M-4RYZ]. 
90 See Geiger & Livingston, supra note 88. 
 91 See id. Note that the overall remarriage rate, like the marriage rate, is decreasing. See 
Krista K. Payne, Change in the U.S. Remarriage Rate, 2008 and 2016, BOWLING GREEN ST. U., 
https://www.bgsu.edu/ncfmr/resources/data/family-profiles/payne-change-remarriage-rate-
fp-18-16.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2020) [https://perma.cc/3H6K-WPBP]. 
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half of comparable women (52%).92 And the rate of remarriage is 
increasing for those aged fifty-five and older: for those between the ages 
of fifty-five and sixty-four, two-thirds (67%) of those previously married 
had remarried in 2013, compared to 55% in 1960, and half of those 
sixty-five and older were remarried, compared to 34% in 1960. 93 
Remarriages remain more likely than first marriages to dissolve.94 
Estate planning for a subsequent marriage is typically more 
complex.95 A spouse in a second marriage may be more likely to enter 
into a prenuptial agreement to preserve existing property.96 Moreover, 
in their empirical study of wills, Danaya Wright and Beth Sterner found 
different patterns of distribution for testators in a subsequent rather 
than an initial marriage.97 For example, almost 50% more of once-
married spouses (58%) left their entire estate to the surviving spouse 
than did those in multiple marriages (40%), and once-married spouses 
were half as likely than those in a later marriage to leave nothing to a 
spouse or to leave property to a surviving spouse and children.98  
A final demographic issue is the relationship among “first families” 
and later, or step-, families, particularly as the number of people with 
92 See Geiger & Livingston, supra note 88. 
 93 See Livingston, supra note 24. The overall rate is 57% for those aged fifty-five and 
older. Id. 
94 See, e.g., JAMIE M. LEWIS & ROSE M. KREIDER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, REMARRIAGE IN 
THE UNITED STATES 1 (2015), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/ 
publications/2015/acs/acs-30.pdf [https://perma.cc/GRF6-PRB3]; James Atlas, Opinion, 
The Extreme (Existential) Makeover, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2013), https://www.nytimes. 
com/2013/03/24/opinion/sunday/the-extreme-existential-makeover.html [https://perma.cc/ 
YEB9-N5RH]. 
 95 See STEPHAN R. LEIMBERG ET AL., THE TOOLS & TECHNIQUES OF ESTATE PLANNING 
FOR MODERN FAMILIES 67 (3d ed. 2019). 
 96 No national data are available on the number, or rate, of prenups, so this is based 
on matrimonial lawyers’ estimates. See, e.g., Jamie Birdwell-Branson, How to Know If You 
Need a Prenup, WEDDING BEE (2019), https://www.weddingbee.com/married-life/how-
to-know-if-you-need-a-prenup/ [https://perma.cc/Y9FA-KFAD]; Geoff Williams, The 
Pros and Cons of Prenups, U.S. NEWS (Aug. 3, 2018, 1:06 PM), https://money. 
usnews.com/money/personal-finance/family-finance/articles/2018-08-03/the-pros-and-
cons-of-prenups [https://perma.cc/EMX6-STZZ] (those in second marriages and 
millennials are requesting prenups). Elizabeth Carter has collected preliminary data for 
one parish in Louisiana. See CARTER, supra note 11, at 4-5. Louisiana is unusual in 
recording the existence of a prenuptial agreement. See id. at 5.  
 97 See Danaya C. Wright & Beth Sterner, Honoring Probable Intent in Intestacy: An 
Empirical Assessment of the Default Rules and the Modern Family, 42 ACTEC L.J. 341, 
364-66 (2017).
98 See id. at 365.
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stepsiblings and stepparents increases.99 In the majority of the elective 
share cases in this study, the share of the subsequent spouse came at the 
expense of an earlier family. In Homeward Bound: Modern Families, Elder 
Care, and Loss, our study of how grown children cared for their dying 
Baby Boomer parents, Amy Ziettlow and I heard numerous stories of 
strained relationships between ex-family members and between former 
stepparents and stepsiblings.100 
IV. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS: WHAT DOES THIS ALL MEAN?
As this analysis shows, disputes over the elective share arise in 
comparatively few reported cases.101 Such an observation provides the 
basis for speculation about the function (goal) and actual operation of 
the elective share. First, the existence of the forced share may have a 
broader impact on estate planning that guards against litigation. By 
serving as an override to the decedent’s careful planning, it provides a 
guideline to estate planners to ensure they address the surviving spouse 
through adequate provision, so there is no reason for election, or by 
arranging for waiver of the right.102 The elective share, under this 
reasoning, continues the privatization of dependency associated with 
marriage,103 and also recognizes marriage as a partnership by 
 99 See Vincent L. Teahan, Estate Planning to Protect Children of Divorce, N.Y. ST. B.J., 
Dec. 2019, at 8, 8, 10 (2019); A Portrait of Stepfamilies, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 13, 2011), 
https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2011/01/13/a-portrait-of-stepfamilies/ [https://perma. 
cc/GS2L-AM2X]. 
 100 Naomi R. Cahn, Revisiting Revocation upon Divorce? , 103 IOWA L. REV. 1879, 
1895-97 (2018) [hereinafter Revocation]; see AMY ZIETTLOW & NAOMI CAHN, HOMEWARD 
BOUND: MODERN FAMILIES, ELDER CARE, AND LOSS 8-9, 35-36, 56-57 (2017). These stories 
included hurt feelings over seating arrangements at funerals. On the other hand, we also 
heard stories of closeness between the decedent and a first spouse and between the 
multiple families. 
 101 Such disputes are most likely to arise over just what is included in the property 
subject to the elective share. See Allison Anna Tait, Corporate Family Law, 112 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1, 41 (2017) (noting as well that disputes may arise over whether one spouse
has abandoned the other).
102 States vary on the procedural and substantive standards for a valid waiver. See, 
e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.1-A (e) (2019); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-213
(amended 2010); Andrew F. Gann, Jr., Note, Prenuptial Agreements and Fraud on the
Widow’s Share: A Look at Virginia’s Law on Premarital Agreement Enforcement at Death,
23 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 231, 239 (2016).
 103 See Cynthia Grant Bowman, A Feminist Proposal to Bring Back Common Law 
Marriage, 75 OR. L. REV. 709, 736-37, 743-44 (1996). Judges in the late nineteenth 
century privatized dependence through the doctrine of common law marriage. 
See Ariela R. Dubler, Note, Governing Through Contract: Common Law Marriage in the 
Nineteenth Century, 107 YALE L.J. 1885, 1886-87 (1998). 
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encouraging provision for the surviving spouse (or ensuring the 
standards for valid waiver). 
Second, as Amy Ziettlow and I found in our analysis of how families 
actually distribute property, formal estate planning, including the 
protections of the elective share, may be functionally irrelevant to many 
families where there is only a first marriage.104 We found that the 
practices of inheritance in only-once-married families generally 
involved few resentments and conflicts.105 Given that decedents are 
three times more likely to be in a first marriage than a subsequent 
marriage, the lack of litigation is not surprising. By contrast, in 
remarried families, the elective share may have greater significance. 
Conflicting family norms profoundly affected experiences and emotions 
surrounding wealth transmission; those tensions are reflected in the 
comparatively high number of cases in this study that involve 
subsequently married families. 
Consequently, the relatively few reported cases in first families may 
show that the elective share is working well: spouses are included in 
estate planning, or, if an elective share is claimed, the joint children do 
not oppose its operation, so there is no litigation. In this situation, it 
may serve its purpose of distributing assets to a spouse who has 
partnered in creating them. 
Or, the relatively few reported cases in first families may show the 
need for reform of the mechanics of the share to recognize that it serves 
different purposes in first and subsequent families. Indeed, more 
generally, disinheritance appears to be relatively infrequent,106 so the 
comparatively high number of second marriage elective share cases 
shows a problem — somewhere. That is, while remarriages are the 
minority of current marriages, they are the majority of marriages giving 
rise to reported elected share cases in this sample. 
In first marriages, or at least in first marriages of longer duration, 
particularly where there are children, the elective share may indeed 
fulfill its goals of, and be appropriate in fostering, partnership and 
104 ZIETTLOW & CAHN, supra note 100, at 128-29. 
105 Id. at 125.  
 106 See Pennell, Individuated Determination, supra note 74. Professor Pennell reports 
approximately 20% of testate cases in his most recent study of Georgia wills. Id. at 12 
n.29. But, as he noted in an earlier article, if a “study only considered testate decedents
[then] all those who died without a will essentially provided the intestate share for their
surviving spouse, making the number of disinheritances out of the total population of
all decedents — testate and intestate alike — extraordinarily small.” Pennell,
Minimizing, supra note 74, at § 903 n.17. Moreover, wills only address probate assets,
and disinheritance in a will does not necessarily mean total disinheritance, given the
number of assets that pass outside of probate.
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support. It recognizes that the spouses may have played differing roles 
and earned unequal amounts during the marriage, typically because of 
gender expectations. While mothers may face a penalty in the workforce 
through “lower perceived competence and commitment, and lower 
recommended salaries,”107 fathers get a “fatherhood boost,” and may be 
perceived as even more committed to their jobs once they have children. 
Surviving ex-spouses are more likely to be women, older women are 
more likely to be the economically weaker spouse, with fewer assets and 
less preparation for retirement.108 And that’s the traditional imagined 
recipient of an elective share.109  
But with a subsequent marriage, particularly one where all children 
are adults, the dynamics are different. There is not always the same need 
for child caretaking (although there may be a need for elder care, 
similarly unrecognized, and adult children may be disabled or return 
home).110 It is thus unclear what goals the elective share fulfills — or 
 107 NAOMI CAHN, JUNE CARBONE & NANCY LEVIT, SHAFTED (forthcoming 2021); see 
Shelley J. Correll et al., Getting a Job: Is There a Motherhood Penalty? , 112 AM. J. 
SOC. 1297, 1298 (2007). The motherhood penalty is what Stanford sociologist Shelley 
Correll found when she sent out fictitious resumes to both students and actual 
employers. Id. at 1298, 1309. On the fatherhood “bonus,” see generally MICHELLE J.
BUDIG, THE FATHERHOOD BONUS & THE MOTHERHOOD PENALTY: PARENTHOOD AND THE
GENDER GAP IN PAY (2014), https://www.thirdway.org/report/the-fatherhood-bonus-
and-the-motherhood-penalty-parenthood-and-the-gender-gap-in-pay [https://perma. 
cc/N9DB-S8JS] (also finding differences by class with respect to the impact of 
parenthood); Claire Cain Miller, The Motherhood Penalty vs. the Fatherhood Bonus, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 6, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/07/upshot/a-child-helps-
your-career-if-youre-a-man.html [https://perma.cc/96NY-NQMR] (“Ms. Correll found 
that employers rate fathers as the most desirable employees . . . .”). 
108 E.g., Ina Jaffe, For Women, Income Inequality Continues into Retirement, NPR (Nov.
17, 2015, 5:46 AM), http://www.npr.org/2015/11/17/455888062/for-women-income-
inequality-continues-into-retirement [https://perma.cc/2KAD-E2RS]; Christian E. 
Weller & Michele E. Tolson, Women’s Economic Risk Exposure and Savings, CTR. FOR 
AM. PROGRESS (Apr. 27, 2017, 9:05 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/ 
economy/reports/2017/04/27/431228/womens-economic-risk-exposure-savings/ 
[https://perma.cc/9JB6-S2B]; see Paula A. Monopoli, Marriage, Property and 
[In]Equality: Remedying ERISA’s Disparate Impact on Spousal Wealth, 119 YALE L.J.
ONLINE 61, 63 (2009) (“Federal retirement and tax policy has effectively concentrated 
the power to control the family’s financial future in the hands of one spouse.”). 
 109 For example, in one of the cases in the study, the husband left his wife to live 
with his girlfriend; the court held that the wife had not abandoned the husband and was 
entitled to the elective share. See Lovett v. Peterson (In re Estate of Peterson), 889 
N.W.2d 753, 759 (Mich. Ct. App. 2016) (finding that the surviving spouse did not 
“willfully cause her” absence).  
 110 See Richard Fry, The Number of People in the Average U.S. Household Is Going Up 
for the First Time in over 160 Years, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 1, 2019), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/10/01/the-number-of-people-in-the-average-
u-s-household-is-going-up-for-the-first-time-in-over-160-years/ [https://perma.cc/EBU6-
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should fulfill — in later marriages.111 To be sure, partnership theories 
remain foundational to marriage, but, particularly for later-in-life 
subsequent marriages, that partnership builds on earlier partnership 
acquisitions of economic and human capital. 
Ultimately, the elective share reflects policy choices concerning 
partnership, dependency, and testator intent. Implementing the 
override system ensures certain policy goals are promoted, and it does 
offer administrative convenience.112 Yet the elective share may do more 
than override the testator’s apparent intent. First, it might actually undo 
estate planning that both spouses may have agreed to when they were 
alive.113 Second, the UPC approach — which does not distinguish 
between marital and individual property, and includes all such property 
in what is subject to the elective share — may be overinclusive if the 
end result is a potential windfall for the surviving spouse based on non-
marital partnership property.114 This is particularly problematic in 
GVU6] (adult children living with parents); Jonathan Vespa, Jobs, Marriage and Kids Come 
Later in Life, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Aug. 9, 2017), https://www.census.gov/ 
library/stories/2017/08/young-adults.html [https://perma.cc/5JED-RQ7P]. A spouse may 
need to care for the other spouse or for parents. See Cahn, The Golden Years, supra note 19, 
at 60; Nina A. Kohn, For Love and Affection: Elder Care and the Law’s Denial of Intra-Family 
Contracts, 54 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 211, 215 (2019); Paola Scommegna, Family Caregiving 
for Older People, PRB (Feb. 24, 2016), https://www.prb.org/todays-research-aging-
caregiving/ [https://perma.cc/6F6F-79SD]. Of course, many remarried couples do care for 
their own separate and joint children together. I-Fen Lin et al., A National Portrait of 
Stepfamilies in Later Life, 73 J. GERONTOLOGY, SERIES B: PSYCHOL. SCI. & SOC. SCI. 1043, 1043 
(2018). 
 111 States have continued to experiment with approaches to elective share reform 
over the last fifty years. See Vallario, supra note 47, at 334-35. Maryland, for example, 
ultimately adopted the concept of the augmented estate and then “reduced that amount 
by a series of complex exclusions,” and it also permits a judicial override. Angela M. 
Vallario, Maryland Treads Water over Elective Share Reform: The Spouse’s Desperate Cry 
for the Court’s Intervention with a Bright-line Rule for Revocable Trusts, 49 U. BALT. L.F. 
1, 15 (2018); see MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 3-404 (2020). Florida’s elective share 
was also revised within the past few years, including through procedural reforms that 
extend the time a surviving spouse has to file the elective share and granting courts the 
power to award attorney’s fees for elective share litigation. See generally Lauren Y. Detzel 
& Brian M. Malec, Recent Amendments Bring Important Changes to Florida’s Elective 
Share, 91 FLA. B.J. 24 (2017). 
 112 The “augmented estate” concept is complicated and includes the property of each 
spouse. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-203 (amended 2010); Waggoner, Time for a 
Reassessment, supra note 14, at 7-8. For a history of the changes in the augmented estate, 
beginning with the 1969 UPC, see O’Brien, supra note 53, at 658-68. 
113 See Gary, supra note 29, at 343. 
 114 See Alan Newman, Incorporating the Partnership Theory of Marriage into Elective-
Share Law: The Approximation System of the Uniform Probate Code and the Deferred-
Community-Property Alternative, 49 EMORY L.J. 487, 522-23 (2000). 
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marriages later in life, where each partner is likely to come into the 
marriage with their own property/human capital.115  
Third, the UPC may be underinclusive and not adequately recognize 
marital labor, at least compared to divorce. Consider the following: 
Suppose Spouse A has substantial separate assets at the time of 
the marriage, and Spouse B does not. Both spouses then — 
through marital efforts — earn significant amounts during the 
marriage, although Spouse B earns more. 
If Spouse B dies first, Spouse A may be entitled to nothing under 
the UPC,116 while a divorce court would equitably distribute the 
property earned during the marriage.  
If Spouse A dies first, then, depending on the size of their 
comparative estates, Spouse B might get a larger share than at 
divorce in a marital property state. 
The results under the elective share are inconsistent with the results of 
property division at divorce; a spouse in a couple that has stayed 
together until death may get more or less than if the relationship had 
ended in divorce, depending on whether the couple lives in a marital 
property, hotchpot, or augmented estate state.117  
And finally, as the cases discussed in this Article show, most 
contemporary forms of the elective share may privilege a subsequent 
spouse over an earlier family. To be sure, the drafters of the UPC were 
 115 See Waggoner, Time for a Reassessment, supra note 14, at 20. In most states, upon 
divorce, tracing precludes separate property from becoming marital: 
In one case, a spouse we represented needed to prove a $16 million brokerage 
account was their separate property. This account was opened before the 
marriage in the early 1990s with a balance of about $500,000. Fortunately, 
our client had saved every brokerage statement and all the paperwork related 
to the investments, which enabled us to prove the account was separate 
property. Unfortunately, this level of record-keeping is rare. 
Ekaterina Klimentova, Why Couples Should Prepare for Divorce Before the Wedding, MKT.
WATCH (Sept. 26, 2019, 9:51 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/why-couples-
should-prepare-for-divorce-before-the-wedding-2019-09-26 [https://perma.cc/L9BV-
72UR].
 116 See Ellen J. Beardsley, The Revised UPC Elective Share: Missing Essential 
Partnership Principles, 13 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 225, 258 (1998) (arguing that the UPC 
is flawed because it “assumes that if the surviving spouse is wealthy in her own right, 
then she is not entitled to an elective share of the decedent’s estate”). 
 117 See Rosenbury, supra note 12; cf. Angela M. Vallario, Spousal Election: Suggested 
Equitable Reform for the Division of Property at Death, 52 CATH. U. L. REV. 519, 531 
(2003). 
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aware of potential unequitable results in a subsequent marriage.118 Yet 
they anticipated such situations would be infrequent enough so as not 
to undercut the general goals and approach.119 
V. MOVING FORWARD
The various policy challenges accompanying elective share statutes 
have inspired numerous law reform proposals from scholars and states 
along a continuum from minor revision to abolition. This Section 
evaluates potential policy reforms and then suggests future directions. 
A. Potential Reforms
The elective share has certainly been subject to criticism, along with 
proposed reforms. The reforms fall on a continuum from relatively 
minor changes to abolition. 
1. Lengthen the Approximation Schedule: Lengthening the
approximation schedule is one approach to addressing the problems
associated with the current elective share statutes. While the current
schedule (full vesting in one-half of the augmented estate after fifteen
years of marriage under the UPC) may be appropriate for first
marriages, the problem comes, as shown in this study, with subsequent
marriages.120 In later marriages, the parties may not accumulate
 118 See Lawrence W. Waggoner, Spousal Rights in Our Multiple-Marriage Society: The 
Revised Uniform Probate Code, 26 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 683, 742-46 (1992) 
[hereinafter Rights in Multiple-Marriage Society].  
 119 See Newman, supra note 114, at 522; Waggoner, Rights in Multiple-Marriage 
Society, supra note 118, at 742-46. In 2003, Professor Waggoner, the Reporter for 
revisions to the UPC, expressed concern about the treatment of remarriages after 
widowhood, but suggested that first marriages and remarriages following divorce were 
adequately represented by the approximation system. See Waggoner, Time for a 
Reassessment, supra note 14, at 20-22. 
 120 See Waggoner, Time for a Reassessment, supra note 14, at 19. The median length 
of a marriage is nineteen years. Median Duration of Current Marriage in Years by Sex by 
Marital Status for the Married Population 15 Years and over, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ACS
_17_5YR_B12504&prodType=table (last visited Feb. 7, 2020) [https://perma.cc/7DJB-
CY9Y] (the data are not broken down by first or subsequent marriage). See generally 
Marriage and Divorce: Patterns by Gender, Race, and Educational Attainment, BUREAU OF 
LAB. STAT. (Oct. 2013), https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2013/article/marriage-and-
divorce-patterns-by-gender-race-and-educational-attainment.htm [https://perma.cc/24BN-
C2GS] (not full lifespan). In 2017, more than 40% of those aged sixty were divorced, 
separated, or in a subsequent marriage. See Andy Kiersz, Here’s When You’re Probably 
Getting Divorced, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 8, 2019, 5:55 AM), https://www.businessinsider. 
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significant amounts of property through their efforts during the 
marriage, as they may be close to retirement;121 or this may be the time 
in life when not only earnings increase, but so does the value of 
investments based on the parties’ premarital human capital and 
financial assets. The current approximation schedule, of course, does 
not distinguish between property acquired before and after the 
marriage.122 
In recognition of the subsequent marriage problem, particularly with 
respect to such a marriage post-widowhood, Lawrence Waggoner 
proposes lengthening the approximation schedule to twenty or twenty-
five years.123 His focus is on addressing “the problem of the post-
widowhood remarriage without shortchanging the surviving spouse in 
the other types of marriages.”124 Lengthening the approximation 
schedule ensures that more of the property subject to the elective share 
was acquired during the subsequent marriage, rather than the earlier 
one and that the spouses have become accustomed to treating that 
property as marital. 
Waggoner identifies a potential problem to lengthening the 
approximation schedule in that it will still overestimate the amount of 
marital property “in the median post-widowhood remarriage.”125 That 
issue does suggest, at the least, that lengthening the schedule is 
inadequate on its own to “approximate” the partnership rationale 
because of this potential for sweeping in too much property. 
2. Revise type of property in the elective share “pot”: A second reform is
changing the type of property in the pot subject to allocation under the
elective share, limiting it to property acquired during the marriage.
Whether this is conceptualized as a deferred community property or
“equitable division” system, the goal is to provide to surviving spouses
with an elective share comparable to the amount to which they would
be entitled at divorce under either a community property or marital
property (non-hotchpot) system.126 In one form, the deferred
com/divorce-statistics-when-americans-get-divorced-2019-2 [https://perma.cc/JD9A-
W3RC]. 
 121 Waggoner, Time for a Reassessment, supra note 14, at 22 (“These are the near- or 
post-retirement years when the parties use the bulk or perhaps all of their assets or the 
income produced by their assets for living expenses.”). 
122 See id. at 21 n.36. 
123 See id. at 23 (discussing potential lengthening of approximation schedule). 
124 Id.  
125 Id. at 26. 
126 See Vallario, supra note 117, at 521; Waggoner, Time for a Reassessment, supra 
note 14, at 30; see also Newman, supra note 114, at 488. States might simply use the 
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community property approach would award the surviving spouse half 
of the couple’s marital property.127 This is similar to the type of division 
in some community property, and some common law property, states 
currently presumed at divorce.128 An alternative is to take that same pot 
of marital, or community, property and divide it equitably, which might 
be appropriate in the majority of states that take this approach at 
divorce.  
As an example, the equitable elective share statute proposed by 
Angela Vallario “pools the decedent and the surviving spouse’s probate 
and non-probate properties, which were accumulated during marriage, 
and entitles the surviving spouse to one half of that amount.”129 Under 
this proposal, all marital assets of both individuals are subject to the 
elective share.130 Vallario’s equitable division proposal also provides for 
the consideration of equitable factors, giving courts discretion to take 
steps to protect the surviving spouse where an equal division is 
inadequate.131  
This system has both similarities and differences to the UPC 
approach. While the elective share under the UPC includes each 
spouse’s separate property in the augmented estate, and while this 
separate property might then be subject to distribution (depending on 
the length of the marriage and the amount of each spouse’s property), 
the marital property pot approach only includes property acquired 
during the marriage for purposes of calculating the elective share.132 
Like the UPC system, it includes both spouses’ probate and nonprobate 
assets. 
Revising the form of property subject to the elective share pot 
eliminates some of the inequities of the current system: it focuses on 
property acquired during the marriage rather than both marital and 
separate property.133 This approach would, however, require the 
classification of property as marital and separate, as well as investigation 
divorce classification system for property at death, relying on longstanding precedent 
concerning, for example, whether to include the passive appreciation in value of 
separate property. 
 127 See Newman, supra note 114, at 523-24. An alternative is simply to impose the 
community property ownership system at divorce in all states. See id. at 558. This would 
eliminate the need for an elective share. 
128 See ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 16. 
129 Vallario, supra note 117, at 562. 
130 See id. at 568. However, the decedent may exclude any of their assets by 
overcoming statutory presumptions that assume all property to be marital. Id. 
131 See id. at 569-570. 
132 See id. at 532. 
133 See id.  
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into nonprobate transfers, incurring significant administrative costs for 
the executor.134 While that process already occurs in divorce 
proceedings,135 it can be bitterly fought.136  
Yet the difficulties of tracing are balanced by the greater potential for 
equitable results.137 This approach may more accurately reflect the 
partnership theory of marriage, as well as bring elective share law in line 
with the division of property at divorce.138 Moreover, while property 
division is integral to any divorce, the calculations for the elective share 
are relevant to a minority of probate cases, because most spouses receive 
either an intestate share or adequate provision under a will or stay out 
of court entirely.139  
The marital property pot system inherently accounts for the length of 
the marriage; the longer the marriage, then, presumably, the more 
marital property accumulated. It thus respects both the partnership and 
support theory of the elective share. It does not, however, provide any 
further protection for a pre-existing family. 
3. Abolish the Elective Share: Others have advocated for abolishing the
elective share using a number of justifications.140 First, elective share
 134 See Waggoner, Time for a Reassessment, supra note 14, at 30. The state would also 
need to determine whether to include active and passive increases in the value of 
separate property. 
135 Newman, supra note 114, at 553-54. 
 136 The simplicity of the elective share system is that it includes all property, without 
any need to classify when and how it was acquired. 
137 Newman, supra note 114, at 553-54. States have developed various doctrines and 
presumptions to address the complexities of property tracing at divorce, such as 
transmutation and commingling, as well as differing presumptions about the 
appreciation in value of separate property. See ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 16; Oldham, 
supra note 15. For the American Law Institute’s presumptions, see PRINCIPLES OF THE
LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 23, § 4.06. 
 138 Newman, supra note 114, at 492 (“[A] deferred-community-property elective-
share system would more fairly and accurately achieve the partnership-theory-of-
marriage objective — equally dividing the fruits of the spouses’ efforts during the 
marriage without subjecting the separate property of the deceased spouse to the 
survivor’s elective-share claim . . . .”). In hotchpot states, of course, such a system would 
provide less at death than on divorce; an alternative approach, as discussed infra, might 
mandate that property subject to distribution at divorce also be included in the elective 
share pot. This property approach includes nonprobate assets, of course, although not 
all other assets in the augmented estate. 
 139 This may be because an estate is settled harmoniously or through small estate 
procedures, or because there are inadequate assets. See ZIETTLOW & CAHN, supra note 
100, at 122.  
 140 See, e.g., Brashier, supra note 39, at 88 (arguing that spouses can protect 
themselves by contract before or during the marriage); Pennell, Minimizing, supra note 
74, § 903 (noting that Georgia, a common law property state, has no elective share 
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statutes interfere with testamentary freedom, hampering an individual’s 
right to transfer property without any restrictions.141 For example, 
Joshua Tate argues that broad testamentary freedom should be allowed 
in order to permit decedents to reward caregivers.142 Second, the 
elective share seems to presume that the decedent irrationally or 
unjustifiably disinherited the surviving spouse;143 yet, as Terry 
Turnipseed argues, there are multiple valid reasons to disinherit a 
spouse that are ignored by the current elective share system.144 A 
decedent may, for example, deliberately disinherit a spouse in an 
attempt to ensure the surviving spouse qualifies for Medicaid 
benefits.145 Or, there may be hidden abuse in the marriage.146 
Third, as a jurisprudential matter, elective share statutes may have 
less justification in today’s society. Elective share statutes were 
originally designed to protect women after their husbands died,147 and, 
while the statutes are gender-neutral, they have not strayed too far from 
their origins and remain more likely to protect women. Consequently, 
statute); Sheldon J. Plager, The Spouse’s Nonbarrable Share: A Solution in Search of a 
Problem, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 682 (1966). 
 141 See Terry L. Turnipseed, Why Shouldn’t I Be Allowed to Leave My Property to 
Whomever I Choose at My Death? (Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Start Loving 
the French), 44 BRANDEIS L.J. 737, 751 (2006). Turnipseed colorfully suggests: “elective 
share laws seem like some ridiculous school child’s Rube Goldberg machine trying to 
solve in as complex a manner as humanly possible a problem that really does not exist.” 
Id. at 793-94 (footnote omitted). 
142 Joshua C. Tate, Caregiving and the Case for Testamentary Freedom, 42 UC DAVIS 
L. REV. 129, 129 (2008); cf. Thomas P. Gallanis & Josephine Gittler, Family Caregiving
and the Law of Succession: A Proposal, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 761, 762 (proposing to
recognize caregiving, albeit by restricting testamentary freedom, by creating an elective
share-type approach for a family caregiver).
 143 See Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Multiple-Marriage Society and Spousal Rights 
Under the Revised Uniform Probate Code, 76 IOWA L. REV. 223, 236-37 (1991) (noting 
that the testator is “seen as having reneged on the bargain”). 
144 See Turnipseed, supra note 141, at 774. 
 145 Id. at 776. On the other hand, states vary as to whether property available through 
exercise of the elective share counts as an asset for Medicaid qualification purposes. See, 
e.g., In re Estate of Brown, 153 A.3d 242, 255 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2017) (yes in
New Jersey); see also Gary, supra note 29, at 370-72 (discussing various approaches);
Pennell, Minimizing, supra note 74, § 903.3 (noting that “[t]he law regarding Medicaid
qualification is in significant turmoil”).
 146 On inheritance and abuse, see, for example, Carla Spivack, Let’s Get Serious: 
Spousal Abuse Should Bar Inheritance, 90 OR. L. REV. 247, 302 (2011). Elder abuse and 
exploitation are growing concerns. 
 147 Turnipseed, supra note 141, at 770 (“It seems that the rhetoric associated with 
forced spousal heirship is premised on a number of myths that simply are not true in 
today’s society.”). Turnipseed notes that “the need to protect surviving spouses . . . has 
decreased dramatically in modern times.” Id. at 751.  
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they may further gendered norms in today’s society, perpetuating “the 
mythical image of women as the ‘weaker sex’ in need of protection, and 
further[] harmful gender stereotypes by relegating women to an inferior 
position.”148 
Potential abolition of the elective share system might still leave in 
place other protections for the surviving spouse, such as the homestead 
allowance.149 
Nonetheless, while complete abolition would protect testator 
freedom and previous families, it would undercut the partnership 
theory of marriage. It would deny any recognition to contributions 
during the marriage that do not take conventional economic forms, 
such as home-work and other aspects of care that cannot be separately 
titled.150 Moreover, it would continue the different treatment of divorce 
and death, allowing a divorcing spouse to receive more than a surviving 
spouse.151 
B. Moving Forward
The core issues remain the goal of elective share statutes and the 
relationship of that goal to the institution of marriage in a world of 
rising remarriage rates and stepfamilies and of changes in women’s 
status. Given that the decision to get married indicates a choice to opt 
into a particular status,152 the elective share does operate within the 
148 Id. at 787 (capitalization omitted); see also Rosenbury, supra note 12. 
 149 Turnipseed, supra note 141, at 780 (“These include: a one hundred percent estate 
tax deduction for transfers to U.S.-citizen spouses; ERISA protection for qualified 
retirement plans . . . ; the family allowance amount (generally a fixed amount or the 
amount necessary to support the surviving family members for a year); Social Security 
spousal survivor benefits; placing valuable property in a tenancy by the entirety or, at a 
minimum, a joint tenancy with right of survivorship; the homestead allowance (to 
ensure the family home flows to the surviving spouse free of encumbrances); the exempt 
personal property set-aside (to ensure certain tangible personal property flows to the 
surviving spouse); the availability of life insurance; the avoidance of will contests; the 
availability of antenuptial and post-nuptial agreements; and the ‘normal affection of 
spouses who choose to remain married.’” (footnotes omitted)). 
150 See Gordon, supra note 39, at 219 (“[T]he non-propertied, electing spouse [is 
viewed as] the disruptor of donative freedom rather than an owner of the property in 
her own right.”). 
 151 Again, in non-hotchpot states, the amount available at divorce is limited to 
marital property, so the amount available at death might be more in those states because 
all property is subject to the elective share. To the extent that the partnership theory of 
marriage should be reconsidered, that should be true for both divorce and death. 
 152 Albeit with the option of opting out. See Carbone & Cahn, The Triple System, 
supra note 65, at 1186; Jacobus tenBroek, California’s Dual System of Family Law: Its 
Origin, Development, and Present Status (pt. 1), 16 STAN. L. REV. 257, 298-317 
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“shadow” of that status.153 It celebrates a marital partnership. 
Partnership may, at least in the short term, be an appropriate 
assumption — and attribute — for at least some marriages, 
notwithstanding its own potential presumptions.154 
Yet remarriage calls into question this partnership model as a spouse 
undertakes a new partnership, particularly when either spouse has prior 
children. This is not an argument for customized marriage,155 but may 
support a more tailored elective share that explicitly accounts for multi-
family partners and changes the focus from the surviving spouse alone 
to the family more generally. 
Some of the proposals discussed above might be an appropriate means 
to recognize changes in the family and the changing status of women, 
and there are others that would accomplish similar goals. 
First, the marital property approach, of limiting the augmented estate 
to property acquired during the marriage and potentially including the 
appreciation of separate property as well, is promising in recognizing 
that marriage is a partnership. There is no need for an approximation 
schedule based on numbers of years of marriage, as the amount of 
property is tied to the length of the marriage. This approach would not 
require major changes in the UPC approach, which already includes 
non-probate assets and certain inter vivos transfer; focusing only on 
property owned at death would be underinclusive, as sophisticated 
estate planning would remove assets from the probate estate.156  
A second reform might focus on acknowledging the potential tension 
when a decedent has more than one family. This could take several 
different forms. One possibility is excluding property from the elective 
share pot that would otherwise be devised to the decedent’s children, 
joint or otherwise. That is the approach of the UPC for the omitted 
(1964) (discussing the distinction between “civil family law” and the mandatory “family 
law of the poor”); Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 
1443, 1460 (1992) (“[S]pouses today have considerable freedom to alter . . . 
background obligations by private contract, either before or during marriage.”). 
153 See Dubler, supra note 31, at 1647. 
 154 Rosenbury, supra note 12, at 1286 (“The partnership theory of marriage is thus 
not free from the expectation of women’s sacrifice within marriage, but rather could be 
seen as reinforcing it.”). While women still experience a gender and wealth gap, that 
may not be the result of the marriage; marriage continues to privatize dependence, even 
if that dependence results from outside of marriage. On the other hand, during a 
marriage, for example, women’s dependence may result from child care or mobility 
choices. 
155 See James Herbie Difonzo, Customized Marriage, 75 IND. L.J. 875, 958 (2000) 
(“The promises made at the altar are better understood as moral obligations rather than 
contractual undertakings.”). 
156 The augmented estate concept has tried to counter these efforts. 
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spouse share,157 which includes in the estate available to the omitted 
spouse only “that portion of the testator’s estate, if any, that neither is 
devised to a child of the testator who was born before the testator 
married the surviving spouse and who is not a child of the surviving 
spouse” along with issue.158 An alternative might be including all 
property in the augmented estate, but precluding the surviving spouse 
from satisfying any deficits in the elective share through any of the 
property left to the children.159 
An alternative might involve changing the fraction of the decedent’s 
estate to which the surviving spouse is entitled where there are 
preexisting children (of either spouse, perhaps). For example, until it 
enacted a new approach in 2013 that has a sliding scale for years of 
marriage adapted from the UPC,160 North Carolina reduced the elective 
share amount available to a subsequent spouse.161 The UPC’s approach 
to intestacy provides a potential guide on how to allocate property when 
either the decedent or the surviving spouse has another family.162 
A third option could be more careful consideration of the situation of 
a spouse who has filed for divorce or who has been separated for a 
substantial period of time. Although many states do not consider 
separation relevant to claiming the elective share, there are some 
exceptions.163 Precluding an elective share would mean the surviving 
 157 Thirteen jurisdictions also protect the share for the preexisting child. See Hirsch, 
Inheritance on the Fringes, supra note 70, at 241 n.32. 
158 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-301(a) (amended 2010). 
 159 If all of the property has been left to the non-joint children, the risk is that the 
surviving spouse receives nothing, as is true with the current omitted spouse share. This 
effectively denies the existence of a marital partnership. 
160 See North Carolina Ties Surviving Spouses’ Rights to the Length of the Marriage, 
MCGUIREWOODS LLP (Nov. 20, 2013), https://www.mcguirewoods.com/client-
resources/Alerts/2013/11/North-Carolina-Surviving-Spouses-Rights [https://perma.cc/ 
P5K3-CQFE]. 
 161 The “applicable share” of the decedent’s assets to which a surviving spouse was 
entitled depended on whether the decedent had a prior spouse and whether the 
decedent was survived by lineal descendants. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3.1(b) (repealed 
2013). 
 162 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-102 (amended 2010) (the surviving spouse receives 
the entire estate if there are only joint descendants, but the least amount where the 
decedent is survived by non-joint descendants). 
 163 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. 3B:8-1 (2019); Hirsch, Inheritance on the Fringes, supra 
note 70, at 269 (noting that separation and misconduct affect the availability of the 
elective share in several states). Oregon’s statute permits a court to deny the elective 
share if the spouses are separated by giving the court discretion to “consider whether 
the marriage was a first or subsequent marriage for either or both of the spouses, the 
contribution of the surviving spouse to the property of the decedent in the form of 
services or transfers of property, the length and cause of the separation and any other 
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spouse in that situation would get nothing;164 by contrast, had a divorce 
been finalized, the surviving spouse would have received an equitable 
distribution of the property.165 It might then be appropriate for the 
spouse to receive the lesser of a divorce or elective share amount.166 An 
alternative is to decrease the amount of the elective share based on the 
number of years of separation as a recognition that property during that 
time period was not acquired through marital efforts.167 
A fourth issue concerns increased integration of estate planning and 
family law. The two come together in this context — the potential 
inclusion, or at least counselling concerning the issue, in prenuptial or 
relevant circumstances.” OR. REV. STAT. § 114.725 (2019). The statute specifies that 
“separation” means living apart, regardless of the filing of a legal action. Id. New York 
precludes election by a spouse who has “abandoned” the decedent, if “such 
abandonment continued until the time of death.” N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-
1.2(5) (McKinney 2019). This provision was at issue in one of the cases in the study, in 
which a 23-year separation did not preclude the surviving spouse from seeking an 
elective share. See In re Duplessis, 1 N.Y.S.3d 128, 130 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014) (executor 
failed to establish that decedent opposed the parties’ separation). In most of the 
community property states, a legal separation prevents the accumulation of additional 
community assets and may dissolve the estate. See Hirsch, Inheritance on the Fringes, 
supra note 70, at 266. The UPC does not address separation. 
 164 When a spouse dies during the pendency of a divorce proceeding, the court no 
longer has jurisdiction over the divorce action. See, e.g., Sperber v. Schwartz, 527 
N.Y.S.2d 279, 281 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988); A.V.B. v. D.B., 985 N.Y.S.2d 840, 844 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 2014). As a result of the abatement of the divorce, the surviving spouse is left 
to pursue an elective share. See Brett R. Turner, Equitable Distribution, Elective Shares, 
and Abatement of Divorce Actions, DIVORCE LITIG., Feb. 2007, at 17 (just before Part III). 
 165 Unlike at death, alimony is available at divorce. Alimony is, however, rarely 
awarded. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 23, at § 
5.07; Laura Hamister, ’Til Death or Irreconcilable Differences Do Us Part: Comparison of 
Support Obligations at Death and Divorce, 22 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 29, 35 (2015) 
(noting the availability of a support allowance at death); Hirsch, Inheritance on the 
Fringes, supra note 70, at 256 (only divorce addresses both property distribution and 
need, and some divorce courts now require the obligor spouse to purchase life insurance 
to benefit an ex-spouse). 
 166 As a New Jersey court noted, “[W]e hold that marital property does not lose its 
essential and distinctive nature as property arising from the joint contributions of both 
spouses during marriage because of the death of one spouse during the pendency of 
divorce proceedings.” Carr v. Carr, 576 A.2d 872, 879 (N.J. 1990). 
 167 Indeed, “the fact that spouses choose to live apart has no apparent impact either 
on society’s interest in ensuring that they receive private support or on the equities of 
recognizing their respective contributions to each other’s wealth.” Hirsch, Inheritance 
on the Fringes, supra note 70, at 267. Identifying just what types of “separation” qualify 
would require difficult line-drawing.  
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postmarital agreements168 of an elective share waiver ensures awareness 
that a decedent’s wishes are subject to state override and, in a 
subsequent marriage, that a first family is protected (if that’s what the 
decedent wishes). 
While family lawyers typically see clients at the beginning or end of a 
marriage, estate planners are more likely to counsel clients during an 
ongoing and harmonious marriage. Yet they too can discuss waiver 
through a marital agreement. Of course, just as people are reluctant to 
plan for death, they are reluctant to plan for divorce;169 nonetheless, 
coherent estate planning and domestic relations counselling involve 
planning for the end of a marriage. 
A series of other options might include the individualized 
determinations suggested by Jeffrey Pennell, which are comparable to 
property distribution procedures in divorce,170 or following Florida’s 
lead in extending the time for filing for the elective share171 or 
permitting judicial override of the elective share statutory amount based 
on a showing of inequity.172  
CONCLUSION 
The elective share, which began as an attempt to support women 
upon the death of their husbands, has moved towards a partnership 
rationale, rather than its original dependency theory. The partnership 
rationale, as discussed earlier, recognizes each spouse’s investment in 
the accumulation of property during the marriage, rather than focusing 
on the surviving spouse’s need for ongoing support.173 But current 
 168 See generally UNIF. PREMARITAL & MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 
2012). For further discussion of the interrelationship between family law and trusts and 
estates, see, for example, Cahn, Revocation, supra note 100, at 1895. 
 169 Cf. Cahn, Revocation, supra note 100, at 1906 (addressing the need for post-
divorce planning to include a first spouse). 
170 See Pennell, Individuated Determination, supra note 74. 
 171 Certainly, for unsophisticated surviving spouses, strict time limits, as some of the 
cases in this study show, can be a stringent bar.  
172 This is similar to the approach in Maryland’s revised elective share, although the 
applicable provision allows for deviation based on “clear and convincing evidence,” 
without specifying just what the evidence must show. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS 
§ 3-413(1) (2020).
 173 Arguably, the partnership theory is most likely to “compensate[] wives who 
forego wage work in order to focus on care work.” Rosenbury, supra note 12, at 1290. 
The support rationale, by contrast, accounts for the impact of caretaking on both the 
caretaker’s income and family well-being. Both recognize the ongoing lack of gender 
equality in either the workplace or the assumption of family responsibilities; a primary 
CAHN MACRO V3.DOCX (DRAFT) (DO NOT DELETE) 6/2/2020 4:37 PM 
2020] What’s Wrong About the Elective Share “Right”? 137
formulations of the elective share fall short in their failure to 
acknowledge the increasing complexity of families174 and to consider 
what happens at the dissolution of a relationship by divorce or by death. 
 Based on the reported cases in this study, the elective share is most 
likely to be contested in subsequent marriages by women; and the 
elective share privileges the interests of the surviving spouse over 
children from earlier relationships. Because of the comparative paucity 
of reported cases concerning first marriages, the legal right of a 
surviving spouse to claim an elective share may be serving as an 
incentive for testators to provide adequately for those spouses, or for 
potentially warring family members to settle before going to court.175  
The current construction of the elective share may be a deliberate 
policy choice, reflecting the state’s strong interest in encouraging 
marriage by ensuring partnership interests to a surviving spouse.176 Or 
it may be an unintended consequence of a policy decision that was 
originally designed to privilege a dependent spouse (and privatize that 
dependency) in a single-marriage society, or another policy choice 
altogether.  
Consideration of any reforms to the elective share should be tied to a 
reconsideration of the justification for the share and its goals, and that 
should include a recognition of the increasing number of multiple 
marriages. Assuming that elective share theory is premised on a marital 
partnership, then it could also be better aligned with family law: 
notwithstanding the differing developments of property distribution 
principles in family law and family protection at death, each indubitably 
breadwinner or the survivor of two equal earners is unlikely to receive much beyond 
their own property under the UPC, for example. 
 174 It also fails fundamentally, to explore fully the question of whether, as a society, 
we really wish to encourage anyone to take on the homemaking role with the 
vulnerability that it entails. 
 175 Of course, there are other reasons for the lack of reported cases, including that 
most estates will have comparatively low levels of assets. Only 0.1% of decedents will 
have paid an estate tax in 2018. See Key Elements of the U.S. Tax System, TAX POL’Y CTR., 
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/how-many-people-pay-estate-tax (last 
visited Feb. 8, 2020) [https://perma.cc/LU4A-MEP2]. 
 176 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599-2605 (2015) (celebrating 
marriage). Moreover, unlike a spouse, a child, outside the state of Louisiana, is not 
entitled to an elective share. See Daniel B. Kelly, Restricting Testamentary Freedom: Ex 
Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1125, 1181 (2013); Phyllis C. 
Taite, Freedom of Disposition v. Duty of Support: What’s a Child Worth? , 2019 WIS. L.
REV. 325, 333-34 (2019) (“The legitime provides a forced share for children under the 
age of twenty three and for mental or physically disabled children at any age.”). 
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occurs as a marriage is ending,177 and each is currently premised on 
comparable conceptions of marriage. 
 177 Similarly, property distribution law could look at elective share laws’ inclusion of 
various types of gifts, such as those made within the last two years of the marriage. 
